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A New Look at Judicial Impact: Attorneys' Fees in
Securities Class Actions After Goldberger v.
Integrated Resources, Inc.
Theodore Eisenberg*
Geoffrey Miller**
Michael A. Perino***
INTRODUCTION
Political scientists studying the judiciary have long been interested
in what, if any, impact judicial decisions have on their intended
audiences, particularly the lower courts that must comply with them.
Compliance in this sense has been defined as the lower court's proper
application of standards the superior court has enunciated in deciding
all cases raising similar or related questions.' Most studies find
widespread compliance in lower courts,2 with only rare instances of
overt defiance.3
This Article attempts to address three questions in the extant
judicial impact literature. First, the existing studies use rather
insensitive measures of compliance and thus may fail to identify
instances of subtle resistance to higher court rulings. Justice
* Henry Allen Mark Professor of Law and Adjunct Professor of Statistical Sciences,
Cornell University.
** Stuyvesant Comfort Professor of Law, New York University.
*** Dean George W. Matheson Professor of Law, St. John's University.
1. This definition of compliance is from G. ALAN TARR, JUDICIAL IMPACT AND STATE
SUPREME COURTS 35 (1977).
2. See, e.g., LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 115 19 (1998);
Sarah C. Benesh & Malia Reddick, Overruled: An Event History Analysis of Loner Court
Reaction to Supreme Court Alteration of Precedent, 64 J. POLITICS 534, 536 (2002); Donald R.
Songer & Reginald S. Sheehan, Supreme Court Impact on Compliance and Outcomes: Miranda
and New York Times in the United States Courts ofAppeals, 43 W. POL. Q. 297 (1990).
3. BAUM, supra note 2, at 116 (citing studies).
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O'Connor once noted that judges "know how to mouth the correct
legal rules with ironic solemnity while avoiding those rules' logical
consequences. 4 In many, if not most cases, lower court judges that
do not like a controlling precedent have a number of strategic options
open to them to avoid applying that precedent, including interpreting
the precedent narrowly, distinguishing it factually, or disposing of the
case on procedural grounds.5
Equally problematic for the study of judicial compliance is the
malleability of stare decisis. Under a strict view of precedent, lower
courts are bound to follow the legal principles articulated by courts
superior to them in the judicial hierarchy.6 But this doctrine can bend
in practical application. Courts may exercise discretion in
determining whether to adhere to stare decisis and may consider,
among other things, social or economic changes that render a
precedent no longer applicable.7 This raises an issue of classification:
which decisions not to apply precedent constitute the appropriate
exercise of judicial discretion and which are simply noncompliant?
The ability of lower court judges to avoid precedents they do not
like and the flexibility of stare decisis confound judicial impact
studies, particularly because the variables used are often only weak
proxies for compliance-for example, the proportion of liberal or
conservative decisions following a liberal or conservative Supreme
Court decision.8 With these kinds of dependent variables, judicial
politics scholars recognize that researchers may often be unable to
identify instances of noncompliance. 9
4. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 500 (1993) (O'Connor, J.
dissenting) (quoting Games v. Fleming Landfill, Inc., 413 S.E.2d 897, 907 (1991)).
5. Benesh & Reddick, supra note 2, at 536.
6. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 24-26 (1986).
7. Kenji Yoshino, Note, What s Past Is Prologue: Precedent in Literature and Lanw, 104
YALE L.J. 471, 476 (1994).
8. See generally Donald R. Songer, The Impact of the Supreme Court on Trends in
Economic Policy Making in the United States Courts of Appeals, 49 J. POL. 830 (1987); Ronald
Stidham & Robert A. Carp, Trial Courts' Responses to Supreme Court Policy Changes: Three
Case Studies, 4 L. & POL'Y Q. 215 (1982).
9. See Donald R. Songer, The Circuit Courts of Appeals, in THE AMERICAN COURTS: A
CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 35, 42-46 (John B. Gates & Charles A. Johnson eds., 1991) (noting that
existing studies have not found areas in which courts of appeals are "clearly defiant or overtly
noncompliant," but recognizing the fact that instances of noncompliance may have been too
subtle for the empirical tests employed).
[Vol. 29:5
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A second limitation in the judicial impact literature lies in its
restrained focus. Judicial politics in general and the judicial impact
literature in particular tend to have a "high court" bias. Scholars
typically devote most of their attention to whether the United States
courts of appeals or state supreme courts comply with the decisions
of the United States Supreme Court. 10 Comparatively few studies"
examine whether United States district courts comply with the
precedents of their circuits, even though most judicial activity occurs
at the trial court level. Over the last two years, there was an average
of nearly 326,000 civil and criminal cases commenced annually in
the United States district courts, compared to about 63,000 appeals
commenced-about 19% of the district total.' 2 During the same time
period, the Supreme Court on average granted review in less than one
hundred cases.1 3 A focus on high court precedents misses most
instances where a court must decide whether or not to comply with
controlling precedent.
In addition to devoting most of their attention to the tip of the
judicial iceberg, scholars studying judicial politics less frequently
examine the ultimate consumers of judicial policies-the members of
society who are subject to the rule the court has announced. 4 This
limitation in the literature is understandable; consumer behavior is
typically much less visible than the behavior of the implementing
courts and therefore much more difficult to study.1 5 Yet judicial
decisions are only words on paper; the real significance of those
10. See Nancy Maveety, The Study of Judicial Behavior and the Discipline of Political
Science, in THE PIONEERS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 18 (Nancy Maveety ed., 2003).
11. See, e.g., Lawrence Baum, Responses of Federal District Judges to Court of Appeals
Policies: An Exploration, 33 W. POL. Q. 217 (1980); Stidham & Carp, supra note 8 (finding
that district court opinions changed in a manner consistent with Supreme Court's new
direction).
12. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS: 2007 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 85, 139, 208 (2008). Of course, the numbers
are even more skewed than this. Within each case commenced in the district court, it will not be
unusual for the judge to write numerous decisions, some of which may be subject to appeal and
some of which will be effectively irreversible.
13. Id.
14. See BRADLEY C. CANON & CHARLES A. JOHNSON, JUDICIAL POLICIES:
IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT 92- 114 (2d ed. 1998).
15. Id. at 95.
2009]
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decisions can be measured only by examining how they affect
litigants and other impacted parties.
The data on comparative caseloads at the various levels of the
judicial hierarchy raise a third question. If large scale compliance
exists, what mechanisms drive it? It has become common to view the
judicial hierarchy as a principal-agent system. 16 Lower court agents
subject to light monitoring have the ability to shirk, which in the case
of judging may involve the district court advancing its own policies
rather than those the appellate court prefers. The caseload data
suggest a relatively small likelihood that any individual decision will
be heard on appeal (much less reversed), a situation which might
create prime conditions for non-compliance. 7 Nonetheless, many
scholars assume that, even when the likelihood of reversal is remote,
fear of reversal plays an important role in keeping lower courts in
line. 18 All else being equal, a judge who is reversed more often may
suffer a loss of reputational capital or reduced prospects for
promotion. If these incentives exist, then one would expect that
where the probability of reversal is higher, compliance will be higher
as well. Yet some recent evidence raises questions about this
argument, finding that there is actually little correlation between the
likelihood of Supreme Court review and compliance.19
The data analyzed in this Article allow us to address each of these
questions (the appropriate measure of compliance, the impact of stare
decisis at the trial court level and in the consumer population, and the
mechanisms driving lower courts to comply with or resist controlling
precedent). Specifically, we examine how the district courts in the
Second Circuit responded to the decision of the Court of Appeals in
16. See, e.g., Donald R. Songer, Jeffrey A. Segal & Charles M. Cameron, The Hierarchy
of Justice: Testing a Principal-Agent Model of Supreme Court-Circuit Court Interactions, 38
AM. J. POL. So. 673 (1994).
17. Consider that, in 2007, of the 62,846 appeals that were terminated in the U.S. Courts
of Appeals, there were only 2,393 reversals (about 4% of the total). In the same year, about
326,000 civil and criminal cases were commenced in the district courts. Taking this latter figure
as a rough approximation of cases available for appeal yields a reversal rate of less than 1%, a
figure that would drop even further given that a single case may yield multiple decisions
capable of appeal. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 12, at 85, 113, 139, 208.
18. David E. Klein & Robert J. Hume, Fear of Reversal as an Explanation of Lower
Court Compliance, 37 L. & Soc'y REv. 579, 582 (2003) (citing studies).
19. Id.
[Vol. 29:5
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Goldberger v. Integrated Resources, Inc.,2 0 a 2000 case that
mandated strict scrutiny by trial court judges of attorneys' fee
applications in class actions and admonished trial courts to seek
"moderation" in awarding fees. Goldberger strongly suggested that
excessively high fee awards had a much greater chance of reversal
than excessively low ones. If federal district courts complied with
Goldberger, we would expect to see lower fee awards and greater
scrutiny of fee requests. We would also expect that plaintiffs'
attorneys would moderate their fee requests.
How much can this analysis tell us about district court compliance
generally? After all, fee setting in securities class actions is just one
narrow legal issue arising in a specific litigation context.
Nonetheless, studying this setting also has several advantages. First,
the variables relevant to fee requests and awards have been
thoroughly studied and thus we know a great deal about how they are
determined.21 When combined with a large database of fee awards
(approximately seven hundred), we have the potential for a much
more precise instrument for studying compliance than past studies
have been able to exploit, and therefore we have a much better
chance to identify more subtle forms of noncompliance.
Second, we have information about the ultimate consumer
population-the plaintiffs' attorneys in securities class actions. Civil
procedure rules require those attorneys to publish a notice of any
settlement and to specify the fee request they intend to make to the
court. The availability of this information allows us to examine
whether Goldberger affected their behavior as well.
Third, the dynamics of this particular setting shed new light on the
hypothesis that judges comply with precedent in order to avoid the
chance of reversal on appeal. The Goldberger court suggested that
reversal on appeal will be more common when a judge awards high
fees than when the judge awards low fees. But, as is explained in
20. 209 F.3d 43, 45 (2d Cir. 2000).
21. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees in Class Action
Settlements: An Empirical Study, I J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. 27 (2004); Michael A. Perino,
Institutional Activism Through Litigation: An Empirical Analysis of Public Pension Fund
Participation in Securities Class Actions (St. John's Legal Studies, Paper No. 06-0055, 2006),
available at, http://papers.ssm.com/abstract-938722.
2009]
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more detail below, 22 in the average securities case, it is the plaintiffs'
attorneys, not the members of the class, who are the most likely to
appeal a fee award. Since they are only likely to do so if the court
awards a low fee, district judges looking to avoid appeals and the
potential for reversal have an incentive to give the attorneys precisely
what they asked for-the exact opposite of what the Goldberger
court wanted. It is only where settlements are very large that it may
be worthwhile for a class member to undertake the costs and burdens
of appeal. These dynamic processes yield a testable hypothesis: if
compliance is tied to fear of reversal, we may observe greater
compliance as settlement size increases. If on the other hand we
observe compliance remaining constant or decreasing with settlement
size, we might doubt that district court behavior in fee-setting is
driven principally by reversal concerns.
Our empirical analysis yields three primary results. First, contrary
to what might be expected, Goldberger is not correlated with a
general decline either in fee awards or in fee requests. On average,
fees demanded and fees received by attorneys in the Second Circuit
post-Goldberger are no lower than the fees they demanded and
received earlier, or the fees in other circuits.
Second, we find that, although Goldberger did not result in a
wholesale lowering of fees, it did have an impact on fee-setting
practices. Specifically, there appears to be an interaction between
Goldberger and settlement size. As settlement size increases, both fee
requests and fee awards rise at a slower rate in the Goldberger cases
(later cases in the Second Circuit) than in the non-Goldberger cases
(cases in other circuits and pre-Goldberger cases in the Second
Circuit). The moderating effect of Goldberger in larger cases
suggests support for the proposition that judges are responding to fear
of reversal.
Third, we examine the ratio of the award to the request as a
measure of the scrutiny with which courts review fee requests. Here
we observe the same general pattern. In some of the models, the
interaction term is again negative and significant, meaning that
increases in settlement size are associated with judges reducing
22. See infra Part 11.
[Vol. 29:5
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requests to a greater degree in Goldberger cases than in non-
Goldberger cases. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis
that compliance is tied to the probability of appeal and reversal:
judges knock fees down more frequently in big cases, where they can
anticipate an objector's appeal based on the argument that the fee
award is too high, than in small cases, where any appeal is more
likely to come from an attorney who argues that the fee is too low.
Overall, our findings might suggest that district courts have
complied only imperfectly with the admonitions of the Goldberger
opinion: fee-setting practices, post-Goldberger, are not markedly
different from those that prevailed before. Yet we would not
necessarily interpret these findings as evidence of disobedience.
Rather, our study suggests limitations in the simple principal-agent
model of judicial hierarchy. Appeals courts like the Second Circuit
see attorneys' fees issues in securities class action cases only rarely;
district courts-especially in New York City-face them on a regular
basis.23 Our data are consistent with a view of Goldberger, not as
conveying definitive orders from higher authority, but rather as an
invitation to a dialogue: a request that the district courts which have
regular exposure to the issues think harder when awarding attorneys'
fees and report back (through subsequent appeals) on the results of
that reconsideration. So viewed, our study suggests that the district
courts may be complying with that broader mandate to reconsider and
report, and that their consensus view, after due deliberation, is that
the pre-Goldberger approach to the determination of fees in securities
class action cases reflected a reasonable accommodation of the
competing policies of incentivizing class counsel and protecting the
class against excessive awards.
The remainder of the Article is structured as follows. Part I
describes fee awards generally and the Goldberger decision. The
section also articulates a number of testable hypotheses concerning
the impact of Goldberger. Part II describes how the dataset used in
the analysis was constructed and specifies how the variables were
defined. Part III contains the empirical analysis. Part IV discusses
these results. A brief conclusion follows.
23. See Harman v. Lyphomed, Inc., 945 F.2d 969, 973 (7th Cir. 1991) ("District courts are
far better suited than appellate courts to assess a reasonable fee in light of the case's history.").
2009]
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I. ATTORNEYS' FEE AWARDS AND THE DECISION IN GOLDBERGER V.
INTEGRA TED RESOURCES, IAC.
Goldberger was a securities class action growing out of the junk
bond scandal involving Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., and
Michael Milken. 4 The defendant, Integrated Resources, Inc., was a
diversified financial services company that allegedly participated in
fraudulent transactions Drexel and Milken orchestrated, resulting in
millions of dollars of losses to its shareholders.25 After complicated
litigation, plaintiffs' lead counsel reached settlements with several
defendants totaling approximately $54.1 million.2 6 Because fees
come out of the common fund created for the benefit of the class,27
and because lawyers are invariably paid on a contingency basis, fee
determinations put the class and the lawyers in a potentially
adversarial relationship. For this reason, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure require courts to approve any fee award to counsel.
2 8
The plaintiffs' law firm in the case requested an attorneys' fee
award equal to 25% of this amount, a bit higher than fees in similarly
sized cases, 29 but not an unusual figure for a securities class action at
that time. The district court judge referred the matter to a special
master who concluded that the proposed fee was reasonable as a
percent of the recovery and recommended that the request be granted
in full. The court, however, returned the issue to the special master
with directions that the fee be recalculated according to what is
known as the "lodestar approach., 30 Applying this methodology, the
special master reviewed counsel's records, cited numerous instances
in which those records were incomplete or conflicting, rejected
charges it found to be excessive, and recommended a substantially
24. For a general overview, see JAMES B. STEWART, DEN OF THIEVES (1991).
25. Goldberger, 209 F.3d at 45.
26. Id at 45-46.
27. Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980).
28. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
29. Goldberger, 209 F.3d at 53.
30. The lodestar method requires the court to calculate the product of counsel's reasonable
hours and reasonable hourly rate and then to adjust this figure (the "lodestar") to account for
other factors, including (in non-fee-shifting cases) counsel's perceived contingency risk. The
adjustment factor is commonly referred to as a "multiplier" because it represents a multiple
(sometimes a fractional multiple) of the lodestar fee. See id.
[Vol. 29:5
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lower award. Ultimately, class counsel received $2,150,030, equal to
just 3.97% of the total recovery and only about 16% of what the law
firm had requested.
Counsel appealed the fee award to the Second Circuit, which
affirmed the district court's order. Reaching far beyond the analysis
needed to resolve the case before it, the appeals court issued a
sweeping opinion that seemed to rewrite the rulebook on attorneys'
fees in the circuit. The court started at first principles. Class members
are uninformed and disorganized, and thus are unable either to
negotiate fees with counsel on the basis of equal bargaining power or
effectively to resist exorbitant fee demands at settlement.3
Accordingly, they are vulnerable to having an excessive share of their
recoveries expropriated by counsel. These structural problems require
the court to act as "guardian" or "fiduciary" of the class with respect
to fees.32
In the exercise of this "jealous regard" for class interests, 33 the
trial court's "overarching" goal34 should be "moderation., 35 The court
used the term "moderation" three times-once even in italics. Given
the court's approval in this case of a less than 4% fee, the term
"moderation" seemed to be a clear signal that fees should generally
be lower than those that district courts had been granting. This
interpretation seems particularly strong given the concerns the court
raised regarding the issue of contingency risk. The court confessed to
a "nagging suspicion" that attorneys are "routinely overcompensated"
36for this factor in securities class actions. Because most such cases
settle, counsel has a high probability of obtaining a fee.37
Accordingly, while courts are not precluded from taking contingency
risk into account in awarding fees, the Goldberger court declared that
31. Id. at 52.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 53.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 52 53.
36. Id. at 57.
37. Id. at 52 (citing Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of
Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 578 (1991)).
2009]
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it is not appropriate to start from the assumption that such risk is
present.38
The court's directive to moderate fees was not merely hortatory.
The Second Circuit warned that judges who fail to limit fees-who
instead passively grant exorbitant fee requests from counsel-face
significant prospects of reversal on appeal: "we have not hesitated to
reverse where we felt an improper appraisal of these factors led to
overcompensation., 39 On the other hand, judges who erred by
slashing fees faced little risk of reversal: "this Court has never found
that a district court abused its discretion by awarding in a common
fund case a fee that counsel assailed as too stingy. 4 °
It is not clear how effective this warning would be in convincing
district judges to reduce fees. To see this, think about the economics
of the typical securities class action. Since the determination of the
award is simply about the allocation of the settlement between the
class and the attorney, defendants can be expected to be indifferent to
the outcome of the fee question and therefore extremely unlikely to
appeal any such award (indeed, it is far from clear that they would
have standing to appeal given their lack of a concrete stake in the
question).4 1 To the extent that there is any adversarial testing of the
fee award, it typically comes from members of the class who object
to the requested fee. Objectors, however, are relatively rare in
42
securities class actions. Rarer still are appeals from class members
38. Goldberger, 209 F.3d at 52.
39. Id. at 53.
40. Id.
41. See REPORT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE, COURT AWARDED ATTORNEY FEES,
108 F.R.D. 237, 266 (1985) ("Since the defendant is interested only in the total size of its
liability, so long as the settlement is accepted, it often will be indifferent as to the division of
the fund between plaintiffs' recovery and the attorneys' fees.").
42. See Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: Howl'
Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J.
2053, 2066 (1995). Eisenberg and Miller's empirical study of all reported class action
settlements over a ten-year period found that the median number of objectors in securities cases
was zero. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in Class
Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1550 (2004). In an
empirical study of class actions in four district courts, researchers at the Federal Judicial Center
found that in 42% to 64% of the cases analyzed there were no objections to settlements.
THOMAS E. WILLGING, LAURAL L. HOOPER & ROBERT J. NIEMIC, EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CLASS
ACTIONS IN FOUR DISTRICT COURTS: FINAL REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL
RULES 57 (1996).
[Vol. 29:5
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because, here too, they would have to bear the costs of appeal but
would in most instances only reap a small benefit from a reduction in
fees.43
In the typical case, the most likely appellant would seem to be, as
in Goldberger, the disappointed law firm that received a lower fee
than it asked for. A district court bent on avoiding reversal of its fee
awards has a simple strategy to avoid appeals and thus the possibility
of reversal: give the law firm what it wants. These dynamics would
only seem to change as the size of the settlement at issue increases.
With larger settlements, any percentage decrease in the fee awarded
represents a much more substantial amount of money for the class.
For very large cases, the prospect of a fee reduction may be
sufficiently attractive that it substantially increases the likelihood that
a class member will be willing to undertake the costs and risks of
appeal. This increased likelihood of appeal should make the court's
warnings in Goldberger about the risk of reversal more potent to both
the lawyers asking for a fee and the court deciding what that fee
should be.
The language of Goldberger and the dynamics of securities class
actions thus provide a useful setting for testing how closely lower
courts comply with the wishes of superior courts, whether individuals
outside the judiciary modify their behavior in light of such
pronouncements, and how much if any role risk of reversal plays in
such compliance. If courts or attorneys conformed their behavior to
the policies the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dictated even
when the possibility of reversal was low, then, all else being equal,
we should see both fee awards and requests that are consistently
lower across cases. In other words, Goldberger should be negatively
correlated with both fee awards and fee requests. If, by contrast, the
impact of Goldberger on awards or requests varies with settlement
size, then this would suggest that compliance is linked to the
probability of appeal and possibility of reversal.
We can also test lower court compliance with Goldberger by
examining whether Goldberger is correlated with the scrutiny with
which the district judge reviews the fee request, here measured by the
43. WILLGING ET AL., supra note 42, at 81 82.
2009]
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ratio of the fee awarded to the fee requested. We should observe the
same pattern. If compliance is unrelated to fear of reversal, then
Goldberger should be negative and significant. A finding that the
ratio varies with settlement size would be consistent with the
hypothesis that fear of reversal plays a role in compliance.
II. THE DATA
Analysis of these hypotheses began with a dataset of 717
settlements in federal securities class actions filed from 1984 through
2005 and settled from 1991 through 2007. Settlements were
identified using Institutional Shareholder Service's Securities Class
Action Services' database ("ISS"), a preexisting database of
securities class action settlements, and from two newsletters,
Securities Class Action Alert and Class Action Reports, that provide
information on legal decisions and settlements in class action
lawsuits. Collectively, these sources appear to provide
comprehensive coverage of securities class action settlements.
For these cases, data were collected on variables that past studies
have shown are correlated with fee amounts44 or that have been
studied in the judicial politics literature on compliance. These data
fall into two broad categories: (1) data on case settlement
characteristics, and (2) data on case characteristics.
Settlement characteristics were coded using data from ISS, the
Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse ("SSCAC"),
Securities Class Action Alert, Class Action Reports, and the federal
courts' Case Management/Electronic Case Filing ("CM/ECF") and
PACER systems. For each case, data were collected on the size of the
settlement, the attorneys' fee request (Fee Request), and the district
court's fee award (Fee). These were measured both as a percentage of
the settlement and in inflation-adjusted 2005 dollars. Cases were
coded "1" if they were decided in the Second Circuit after the
Goldberger decision and "0" otherwise (Goldberger).
Data on case characteristics came from a variety of sources,
including published judicial decisions, settlement notices, media
articles, SSCAC, and docket sheets and court filings available
44. These studies are discussed in more detail in Perino, supra note 21.
[Vol. 29:5
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through the CM/ECF and PACER systems. We coded the number of
docket entries in the case (Docket Entries) and the age of the case (in
years) from first filing until settlement (Age), both of which serve as
proxies for case complexity and litigation effort. Data were also
collected on the presence of an SEC or other governmental action
(Government Action) involving the same allegations at issue in the
securities class action, which may serve as a proxy for case quality. A
Government Action may also suggest that less litigation effort was
necessary to achieve the settlement, possibly resulting in lower fees.
Past research has shown that the presence of a public pension fund
as a lead plaintiff (Public Pension) is correlated with lower fees and
fee requests. 4' Research has also shown that cases involving a
particular firm, Milberg Weiss (Milberg Weiss), had significantly
higher fee requests and fee awards. High profile class actions may
result in lower fee awards, all else being equal, because they may
involve relatively obvious cases of fraud that require less litigation
effort. The Article therefore defines an indicator variable (High
Profile) that takes a value of "1" if the case is in the top quartile of
estimated damages in the sample,46  contains an allegation of
accounting fraud, and involves a parallel government action.
A few courts have experimented with auctioning off the role of
lead counsel (Auction).47 Although such auctions are rare and have
been subject to both academic 48 and judicial49 criticism, researchsuggests that they are correlated with lower fee requests and fee
45. Perino, supra note 21, at 12 13.
46. As a proxy for estimated damages, the Article uses the Maximum Dollar Loss
("MDL"). MDL is the maximum dollar loss during the class period alleged in the complaint and
is defined as the dollar value decrease (in constant 2005 dollars) of the defendant issuer's
market capitalization from its peak market capitalization during the class period to the first
trading day after the end of the class period. Past studies have shown that MDL is highly
correlated with potential damages. Mukesh Bajal, Sumon C. Mazumdar & Atulya Sarin,
Securities Class Action Settlements, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1001, 1014 (2002-2003).
47. An early discussion, and qualified endorsement, of the auction idea is found in
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Action and
Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1 (1991).
48. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Laiwyers on the Auction Block: Evaluating the Selection of
Class Counsel by Auction, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 650, 727-28 (2002).
49. REPORT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE, SELECTION OF CLASS COUNSEL, 208
F.R.D. 340. 372 85 (2002).
2009]
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awards.5° Prior research has also shown that judicial experience
(Experience) with securities class actions (measured here by the
proportion of securities class actions filed in a district over a five-
year study period) is negatively correlated with fee awards.'
To control for inter-circuit variation in the treatment of fees, the
regressions include indicator variables for circuits, with the Second
Circuit as the reference category. To control for potential changes in
fee awards over time, indicator variables were created for each year
in which a settlement was approved and fees were awarded. The
regressions use 1991, the earliest settlement year in the dataset, as the
reference category.
Descriptive statistics for the dataset appear in Table 1 below.
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
A. Are Attorneys Fees Lower After Goldberger?
We begin with a simple comparison of fees awarded in cases in
the Second Circuit in which Goldberger was a controlling precedent
and those in which it was not. As shown in Figure 1, mean and
median fees in the non-Goldberger cases are 28.35% and 30%,
respectively (measured as a percentage of the settlement in the case).
These figures are significantly higher than those in the cases in which
Goldberger was a controlling precedent (26.03% and 27.25 %).52
While this finding suggests some compliance with Goldberger, it
appears that fees were generally declining during this same time
period. Mean (median) fees in the cases decided across all circuits in
the years prior to 2000 (the year Goldberger was decided) were
27.63% (30%), significantly higher than the fees in the cases decided
in the later part of the sample period, 26.06% (26.94%). 3 Indeed,
50. Perino, supra note 21, at 29.
51. Michael A. Perino, Markets and Monitors: The Impact of Competition and Experience
on Attorneys' Fees in Securities Class Actions (St. John's Legal Studies, Paper No. 06-0034,
2006), available at Jan. 2006, http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract id-870577.
52. In a t test of the means, the t statistic was 2.332 (probability - 0.021). A Mann-
Whitney rank-sum test comparing the medians yielded a z statistic of 2.777 (probability -
0.006).
53. These differences are statistically significant. In a t test of the means, the t statistic
was 3.0407 (probability - 0.0025). A Mann-Whitney rank-sum test comparing the medians
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there is no significant difference between post-Goldberger fees in the
Second Circuit and post-Goldberger fees elsewhere.5 4 So it may be
that the lower fees in the Second Circuit following Goldberger were
due to a secular decline in fees and not to compliance with
Goldberger.55 Even if that were not the case, if we define compliance
with Goldberger to require the kind of dramatically lower fees that
were approved in that case (4%), it is hard to say that lower courts
did in fact comply with an interpretation of the Goldberger decision
as mandating lower fees across the board.
Is there any evidence that the size of fee awards is linked to the
likelihood of appeal? Figure 2A contains a scatter plot of the log-
transformed size of the settlement and the log-transformed size of the
fee award (both of which are measured in constant 2005 dollars).
Figure 2A suggests that the relationship between settlement size and
fee awards is not constant in the Goldberger versus non-Goldberger
cases. We can clearly see this in the two prediction lines in the figure.
As settlement size increases, the fee awards in the Goldberger cases
appear to grow at a slower rate than fee awards in other cases. It is
possible that the few very large settlements in the database are unduly
influencing the slope of this line, so Figure 2B excludes settlements
in excess of twenty on the natural log scale. Although the differential
relationship between settlement and fee awards in the two sets of
cases is less dramatic in Figure 2B, it remains. These data suggest the
possibility that judges in response to Goldberger reduce their fee
awards, but only in the largest cases, perhaps because they expected
those cases to be subject to greater appellate scrutiny and thus faced a
higher risk of reversal.
Of course, other variables might be driving that result as well. For
example, if plaintiffs' attorneys were concerned about the higher
risks of reversal that Goldberger may have created, perhaps they
moderated their fee requests in the largest cases. In other words,
perhaps the apparent interaction between awards and settlement size
yielded a z statistic of 2.874 (probability - 0.0041).
54. Mean fees were 26.07% in the Second Circuit and 26.17% in other circuits (t = 0.156,
probability - 0.876).
55. Because fees decline with settlement size, see Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 21, the
observed decline in percentage fees might also be attributable to the recent increase in average
settlement size.
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is a function not of the judges complying with Goldberger, but of
attorneys complying with Goldberger. To see if this might be the
case, Figures 3A and 3B recreate the scatter plots using logged fee
requests instead of logged fee awards. The same interaction exists
here, suggesting that attorneys may have modified their behavior in
light of Goldberger.
To fully test the relationship between Goldberger and fee awards
and fee requests, we ran linear regressions, with either the log-
transformed fee award or fee request (in constant 2005 dollars) as the
dependent variables. The explanatory variables are settlement size
and the other previously identified variables that are correlated with
fee awards and requests. The regressions include year- and circuit-
fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by circuit.
Models 1 through 3 are for fee awards. Model 1 contains an
indicator variable for Goldberger, which is positive but insignificant.
The hypothesized relationship was negative, so there seems to be
little reason to believe that Goldberger generally led to lower fees.
Model 2 includes an interaction (Goldberger Settle) that is the
product of Goldberger and Settlement. The coefficient of this variable
is negative and statistically significant. All else being equal, in the
Goldberger cases a 1% change in the settlement amount yields a
0.07% smaller increase in fee award than in the non-Goldberger
cases. In other words, there is significant evidence that as settlements
grow larger the fee awards in Goldberger cases grow at a slightly
slower rate than the fee awards in the other cases. As a robustness
check, Model 3 re-runs the regression on a sample that excludes log
settlements of twenty or greater with nearly identical results.
While these findings suggest some kind of compliance with the
dictates of Goldberger, two features are notable. First, Goldberger
seemed to call for a dramatic reduction in the fees attorneys
received-the case, after all, approved a less-than-4% fee. The small
size of the coefficient for the interaction suggests that courts' fee
awarding practices did not change nearly so much as a broad reading
of Goldberger would contemplate. Second, a logical reading of
Goldberger would seem to require those cuts to occur across the
board. But rather than doing that, judges seem to award the lower
fees primarily in the largest cases, which at least suggests the
possibility that they were motivated to demonstrate compliance with
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Goldberger primarily in the cases that had the greatest chance of
appeal.
It remains unclear from these regressions, however, whether
Goldberger led courts to change their fee awarding behavior. Models
4 through 6 thus use the same independent variables but substitute the
log fee request as the dependent variable. Again we see in Model 4
that Goldberger is insignificant, suggesting no overall effect on fee
requests. But, as with fee awards, the interaction term is negative and
significant. In Model 5, all else being equal, in the Goldberger cases
a 1% change in the settlement amount on average yields a 0.06%
smaller increase in fee request than in the non-Goldberger cases. As
this coefficient is nearly identical to the one reported in Model 2, it is
possible that it was the attorneys who changed their behavior in
response to Goldberger, not the courts. The interaction is again
consistent with the hypothesis that attorneys reduced their fee
requests primarily in the largest cases-those that represented the
highest risk of appeal.
A somewhat different picture emerges from Model 6. Here, the
interaction coefficient remains negative and significant, but is much
smaller than for the equivalent model that tests fee awards (Model 3).
These results are consistent with the hypothesis that both attorneys
and courts changed their behavior in response to Goldberger.
Attorneys reduced their fee requests as settlement size increased and
courts cut these requests slightly more.
One final interesting result in Table 2 is with respect to the year-
fixed effects. Starting in 1998, the coefficient for each year in the fee
award regressions is negative and significant. All else being equal,
fee awards in these years were notably lower than the reference year
of 1991. It is impossible to attribute the drop in fee awards to
Goldberger, which was not decided until 2000. A more plausible
explanation is the impact of public pension funds, which became
increasingly active as lead plaintiffs in securities class actions starting
at around that time and whose presence has been shown to be
56
correlated with lower fee awards. Fee requests are significantly
lower as well, although there the effect is not consistently significant
56. See Perino, supra note 21.
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until 2000. While it is possible that the decline in fee requests could
be linked to Goldberger, it seems equally if not more likely that it
was the result of the overall downward trend in fee awards.
B. Do Courts Scrutinize Fee Requests More Closely After
Goldberger?
To assess changes in the level of scrutiny judges give attorneys'
fee requests after Goldberger, we calculate the ratio of fee award to
the fee request. Figure 4 shows the distribution of these ratios in the
Goldberger and non-Goldberger cases. It shows that overall judges
take a light touch when it comes to reviewing fee requests. In the
non-Goldberger cases, attorneys received a mean fee equaling 91.8%
of their request. In the median case, the attorneys received precisely
what they requested. By contrast, in the Goldberger cases the mean
ratio was 85.7%, with a median of 90%. These differences in means
and medians are statistically significant, 57 suggesting that judges did
comply with Goldberger by more vigorously reducing attorneys' fee
requests. Here too, however, the degree of change is smaller than
what the appellate judges in Goldberger seemed to contemplate.
We look also at the mean and median ratios just in the Second
Circuit before and after Goldberger. As shown in Figure 5, there is a
slight decline in means, from 87.64% to 85.54%, although this
difference is statistically insignificant. There is a steeper drop in
medians, from 99.01% to 90.01%, although this difference is only
significant at the 10% level.
To better test the relationship between Goldberger and the ratio of
award to request, we ran linear regressions, with the ratio of award to
request as the dependent variable. The explanatory variables are
settlement size and the other previously identified variables that are
correlated with fee awards and requests. The regressions include
year- and circuit-fixed effects. Standard errors are again clustered by
circuit.
57. In the I test used to compare means, the I statistic was 4.1763 (probability < 0.0001).
The Mann-Whitney rank-sum test was used to compare the medians. The test yielded a z
statistic of 3.460 (probability - 0.0005).
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The results of these regressions are reported in Table 3. Models 1
through 3 are for the full sample of ratios. Model 1 includes
Goldberger without any interaction. The coefficient is negative but
insignificant so there is no evidence that judges subject to Goldberger
were generally more rigorous in their review of attorneys' fee
requests. Model 2 includes an interaction term to test again whether
judges reduce fees more in the cases that are more likely to be
appealed. Although the interaction term is negative, it too is
insignificant. Model 3 excludes from the analysis logged settlements
in excess of twenty. 58 Here, the interaction term is negative and
significant, which is consistent with the hypothesis that judges
subject to Goldberger increase the scrutiny they give fee requests in
those cases in which the likelihood of appeal is greater.
As we saw with fee awards, there is some evidence that courts'
scrutiny of fee requests became more vigorous over time. In Models
1 through 3 the year-fixed effects are generally negative and many
are significant, although not nearly so consistently as in Table 2. This
finding suggests greater judicial scrutiny of fees over the reference
time period of 1991. But again, this increased scrutiny can hardly be
the product of the decision in Goldberger because it begins before the
decision, not after it.
Next, we wanted to focus on the cases in which the court actually
reduced the fee request, i.e. those cases in which the ratio was less
than one. Perhaps among the courts willing to reduce fee requests,
those subject to Goldberger gave even greater scrutiny to the
proposed fees. Models 4 through 6 run the regressions on this sub-
sample. The results are largely consistent with the results for the full
sample. Both Goldberger and the interaction term are insignificant in
the first two models, but are significant in Model 6, which excludes
logged settlements in excess of twenty. So this too provides
additional support for the hypothesis that Goldberger's impact was
not universal but varied with the likelihood of appeal. The year-fixed
effects are negative and become consistently significant starting in
1996, well before the decision in Goldberger.
58. This is consistent with the analysis of fee awards and fee requests. As an alternative
specification, the model was run excluding just six outlying settlements, those in excess of $1
billion. The results are consistent with those reported in Model 3.
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Taken together, these data provide some support for the
hypothesis that courts in the Second Circuit complied with the
admonition in Goldberger that they scrutinize fee requests more
vigorously. Again, however, the increase in scrutiny is much smaller
than what the Second Circuit may have hoped. Compliance seems to
increase as the likelihood of appeal increases, suggesting that
compliance is linked to risk of reversal.
IV. DISCUSSION
The results reported here are consistent with the hypothesis that
judges' compliance is tied to fear of reversal. Of course, other
explanations for the pattern we observe in the data are possible. For
example, Goldberger was decided in 2000, shortly after large
institutional investors started to become increasingly active as lead
plaintiffs in these cases. Large institutions, particularly public
pension funds, appear to engage in negotiations over fees, and prior
research has shown that their participation in class actions is
correlated with lower fee requests and awards. 9 While we control for
the presence of such plaintiffs in the case, it is possible that
institutional investor activism began to influence fee requests and
awards in other cases as well. Indeed, we noted earlier that their
activism might explain the general decline in fees we observe since
1998. As institutions have been most active in larger cases, perhaps
their influence is felt most strongly there, explaining why requests,
fees, and scrutiny vary with case size.
Another potential explanation for the pattern we observe is that
judges may have read Goldberger more narrowly than we do.
Goldberger was a large securities class action settlement of over $50
million. Many of the Second Circuit's pronouncements about over-
rewarding attorneys for contingency risk were focused on these mega
cases. Perhaps judges took this language to mean that they could
focus their efforts on the large cases, thereby explaining the pattern
we observe. In other words, maybe Goldberger stands for the
proposition that judges should rigorously scrutinize fees in big cases,
exactly as they ended up doing.
59. Perino, supra note 21.
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Our data are also consistent with an interpretation of Goldberger,
not as mandating any particular behavior with respect to fees, but
rather as instructing the district courts to exercise greater scrutiny and
more deliberation. This interpretation is consistent with Goldberger's
rejection of "benchmark" approaches to fee-setting. In this view,
Goldberger was a command invitation to trial courts to engage in a
dialogue as to the proper measure of fees in securities class action
cases. The district courts were, in effect, instructed to reconsider their
prior practices and to report back (through appeals) on the results.
Preliminary results of that process of reconsideration are now in. The
consensus of the trial court judges appears to be that the preexisting
practice was generally appropriate, even when viewed in light of the
considerations set forth in Goldberger, but that fees in larger cases
required some (albeit relatively slight) downward adjustment. This
view of the data suggests that a simple principal-agent model may not
always capture the full details of the relationship between trial and
appellate courts: perhaps appellate courts sometimes behave more
like senior partners in law firms than military commanders issuing
orders to the troops.
CONCLUSION
Appeals court rulings should always be of interest to trial courts,
but the Goldberger decision was especially noteworthy. The court's
sweeping analysis and broad generalizations, its approval of a fee
which many in the plaintiffs bar undoubtedly considered shockingly
low, its rhetoric (which contained strong disapproving overtones
about class counsel's greed), and its repeated intimations that the fee
demanded in the case was grossly excessive, all demanded attention.
But how would the trial courts and the plaintiffs' attorneys respond?
Our study finds that fees have declined somewhat in recent years,
but these declines appear to be unrelated to the Second Circuit's
decision. Indeed, we find that Goldberger is not correlated with a
general decline in fee awards and fee requests. Instead, there appears
to be an interaction between Goldberger and settlement size. As
settlement size increases both fee requests and fee awards rise at a
slower rate in the Goldberger cases than in the non-Goldberger
cases. In addition, we examine the ratio of the award to the request as
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a measure of the scrutiny with which courts review fee requests, and
we observe the same general pattern. In at least some of the models,
the interaction term is again negative and significant, meaning that
increases in settlement size are associated with judges reducing
requests to a greater degree in Goldberger versus non-Goldberger
cases. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that
compliance is tied to the probability of appeal and reversal.
These findings are subject to differing interpretations. If
compliance with Goldberger required plaintiffs' lawyers to ask for
drastically lower fees or district judges to slash fees dramatically,
then it seems that neither attorneys nor courts complied in any
meaningful sense. If, on the other hand, the case is interpreted in a
more limited sense, as demanding that trial courts and class counsel
carefully rethink prevailing practices, then the evidence we observe
can be seen as consistent with the proposition that the relevant actors
are complying with Goldberger by taking greater care in the matter
of fees, even if the result of that process is largely consistent with
prior practice.
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APPENDIX
"
TABLE I: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
N Mean
Goldberger 717 0.215
Settlement 717 49.079
Fee Request (%) 702 0.295
Fee (Y,) 674 0.266
Gov 't Action 717 0.351
Docket Entries 716 190.473
Case Age 717 2.940
Experience 717 0.060
Public Pension 717 0.109
High Profile 717 0.082
A uction 717 0.018
Milberg 717 0.490
Ist Circuit 717 0.056
2nd Circuit 717 0.346
3rd Circuit 717 0.064
4th Circuit 717 0.025
5th Circuit 717 0.052
6th Circuit 717 0.046
7th Circuit 717 0.038
8th Circuit 717 0.022
9th Circuit 717 0.264
10th Circuit 717 0.024
1 th ( 'ircui 717 0.063
).C. Circuit 717 0.001
Year 1991 717 0.011
Year 1992 717 0.017
Year 1993 717 0.018
Year 1994 717 0.021
Year 1995 717 0.017
Year 1996 717 0.061
Year 1997 717 0.039
Year 1998 717 0.047
Year 1999 717 0.061
Year 2000 717 0.103
Year 200/ 717 0.109
Year 2002 717 0.138
Year 2003 717 0.132
Year 2004 717 0.103
Year 2005 717 0.071
Year 2006 717 0.031
Year 2007 717 0.020
Note: Settlement is in millions of constant 2005 dollars.
relevant Setleinent. Class Period and (Case Age are in years.
Median Std. Dev.
0.000 0.411
7.029 271.143
0.300 0.056
0.280 0.067
0.000 0.478
111.500 334.152
2.597 1.624
0.049 0.041
0.000 0.312
0.000 0.275
0.000 0.134
0.000 0.500
0.000 0.230
0.000 0.476
0.000 0.245
0.000 0.157
0.000 0.221
0.000 0.210
0.000 0.190
0.000 0.148
0.000 0.441
0.000 0.152
0.000 0.243
0.000 0.037
0.000 0.105
0.000 0.128
0.000 0.134
0.000 0.143
0.000 0.128
0.000 0.240
0.000 0.194
0.000 0.213
0.000 0.240
0.000 0.304
0.000 0.312
0.000 0.345
0.000 0.339
0.000 0.304
0.000 0.257
0.000 0.173
0.000 0.138
Fee Request and Fee are percentages of the
Sources Institutional Shareholder Services, Securities (lass Action Database; Stanford Law School,
Securities Class Action Clearinghouse, CRSP, COMPUSTAT, CM/ECF, PACER, Securities Class Action
Alert (/lass Action Reports.
"t Appendix does not conform to THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION
(Columbia Law Review Ass'n et al. eds., 18th ed. 2005).
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TABLE 2: REGRESSIONS FOR FEE AwARDs AND FEE REQUESTS
Logged Fee Awards Logged Fee Requests
(1) (2) A(3) 4) (5) (6)
Miberg 0.061 0.056 0.049 0.059 0.055 0.042
(2.61)* (2.36)* (2.24)* (2.28)* (2.18) (I.82)
Pubic Pension -0.173 -0.181 -0.170 -0.248 -0.255 -0.227
(5.41)** (5.35)** (6.50)** (5.72)** (5.77)** (7.70)**
Settlement 0.936 0.955 0.970 0.972 0.988 0.986
(29.08)** (37.10)** (41.71)** (80.46)** (92.45)** (83.97)**
Gov 'tA ction -0.001 -0.008 -0.003 -0.003 -0.007 -0.015
(0.05) (0.44) (0.17) (0.22) (0.70) (1.20)
High Profile -0.127 -0.126 -0.115 -0.100 -0.100 -0.058
(2.18) (2.08) (1.83) (2.19) (2.08) (0.84)
A uction -0.586 -0.616 -0.540 -0.575 -0.599 -0.632
(6.19)** (6.21)** (6.26)** (6.57)** (7.85)** (6.65)**
I)ockct hntries -0.040 -0.040 -0.019 -0.044 -0.044 -0.026
(1.71) (1.75) (0.69) (2.74)* (2.82)* (1.46)
-xperience -0.482 -0.395 -0.370 -0.473 -0.396 -0.270
(8.72)** (4.73)** (2.73)* (6.43)** (3.91)** (2.14)
Age 0.119 0.114 0.102 0.071 0.067 0.055
(4.83)** (4.58)** (7.05)** (4.17)** (4.01)** (3.06)*
0 C'O 133 0 130 0.060 0.023 0.022 0.020
(4.84)** (4.96)** (3.53)** (0.52) (0.49) (0.45)
3d( r.r't 0 152 0.140 0 108 0.084 0.076 0.077
(3.02)* (2.94)* (3.30)** (2.61)* (2.32)* (2.77)*
41h (ircuil 0.187 0.174 0.113 0.075 0.065 0.062
(6.55)** (6.35)** (4.37)** (1.53) (1 .35) (1.14)
51h (ircuil 0.068 0.060 0.017 -0.033 -0.038 -0.016
(2.11) (2.03) (0.89) (0.92) (I.05) (0.42)
61h Circui 0.161 0.151 0.078 0.071 0.065 0.061
(4.27)** (4.14)** (2.91)* (1.62) (I.49) (I.52)
71h (ircuil 0.188 0.183 0.101 0.076 0.073 0.070
(5.92)** (5.57)** (6.13)** (1.58) (1.59) (I.50)
81h Circuit 0.178 0.168 0.117 0.031 0.024 0.038
(4.55)** (4.61)** (4.86)** (0.75) (0.57) (0.91)
9th (frcuil 0.035 0.028 -0.036 -0.025 -0.030 -0.032
(1.33) (1.17) (2.33)* (0.62) (0.73) (0.75)
10th Circuit 0.085 0.090 0.035 -0.089 -0.084 -0.082
(5.20)** (5.20)** (1.61) (1.68) (1.69) (1.67)
1 th Circuit 0 133 0 134 0.076 0.041 0.044 0.044
(4.92)** (4.90)** (3.90)** (1.02) (1.13) (1.08)
IC Circuit 0.246 0.230 0.116 0.167 0.156 0.129
(4.84)** (4.41)** (1.64) (2.06) (1.82) (1.33)
Year 1992 -0.111 -0.110 -0.116 -0.124 -0.120 -0.117
(2.42)* (2.65)* (3.11)** (3.68)** (3.85)** (3.92)**
Year 1993 -0.286 -0.289 -0.125 -0.056 -0.058 -0.068
(1.51) (1.47) (1.19) (1.07) (1.34) (2.00)
Year 1994 -0.151 -0.135 -0.121 -0.059 -0.050 -0.045
(1.81) (1.64) (1.48) (1.16) (1.05) (0.90)
Year 1995 -0.040 -0.030 -0.031 -0.049 -0.041 -0.033
(0.95) (0.65) (0.68) (1.10) (0.88) (0.63)
Year 1996 -0.117 -0.113 -0.119 -0.025 -0.021 -0.014
(2.23)* (2.27)* (3.37)** (2.13 ) (1.50) (0.75)
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Logged Fee Awards Logged Fee Requests
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Year 1997 -0.178 -0.176 -0.197 -0.014 -0.013 -0.009
(2.01) (2.08) (2.72)* (0.94) (1.01) (0.69)
Year 1998 -0.116 -0.116 -0.131 -0.052 -0.052 -0.045
(5.01)** (7.05)** (8.02)** (1.53) (1.87) (1.76)
Year 1999 -0.153 -0.158 -0.171 -0.046 -0.050 -0.051
(2.96)* (3.62)** (5.15)** (1.25) (I.57) (1.45)
Year 2000 -0.200 -0.195 -0.181 -0.115 -0.111 -0.108
(4.13)** (4.21)** (3.76)** (2.34)* (2.34)* (2.76)*
Year 2001 -0.202 -0.197 -0.179 -0.109 -0.104 -0. 101
(4.17)** (4.45)** (3.68)** (2.21)* (2.27)* (2.54)*
Year 2002 -0.203 -0.200 -0.175 -0.129 -0.127 -0.119
(7.84)** (8.38)** (7.78)** (2.65)* (2.81)* (3.10)*
Year 2003 -0.201 -0.200 -0.171 -0.126 -0.127 -0.123
(6.10)** (6.68)** (6.09)** (2.42)* (2.62)* (3.12)**
Year 2004 -0.216 -0.206 -0.204 -0.161 -0.152 -0.163
(4.04)** (4.04)** (4.01)** (2.48)* (2.42)* (3.10)*
Year 2005 -0.273 -0.267 -0.265 -0.215 -0.208 -0.214
(9.48)** (9.81)** (6.70)** (5.89)** (5.93)** (6.17)**
Year 2006 -0.431 -0.413 -0.353 -0.320 -0.306 -0.245
(6.39)** (5.90)** (5.20)** (2.93)* (2.74)* (2.53)*
Year 207 -0.396 -0.392 -0.408 -0.345 -0.343 -0.382
(3.89)** (4.22)** (4.32)** (2.79)* (2.97)* (3.85)**
Constant -0.094 -0.396 -0.682 -0.516 -0.761 -0.806
(0.26) (1.51) (3.42)** (3.26)** (5.67)** (5.78)**
Observations 686 686 674 702 702 690
R-squared 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.98 0.99 0.99
Robust t statistics in parentheses.
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Note All models cluster standard errors by circuit with t statistics reported in parentheses. Models 1-3 use the
log-transformed fee request measured in constant 2005 dollars as the dependent variable. Models 4-6 use the
fee request as a proportion of the settlement as the dependent variable. As a robustness check, Models 3 and 6
omit logged settlements in excess of 20. Settlement, Docket hntrie, and Age are log-transformed. Settlement is
in constant 2005 dollars.
Sources Institutional Shareholder Services, Securities (lass Action Database; Stanford Law School,
Securities Class Action CTearinghouse, CRSP, COMPUSTAT, CM/ECF; PACER, Securities C/ass Action
Alert; (lass Action Reports.
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TABLE 3: REGRESSIONS FOR RATIO OF AWARD TO REQUEST
Full Sample Ratios < 1
Milberg 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.00/ 0.006 0.008
(0.19) (0.08) (0.45) (0.64) (0.57) (0.97)
Public Pensioi 0.059 0.057 0.048 0.090 0.090 0.075
(2.95)* (2.79)* (3.20)** (2.21)* (2.17)f (2.51)*
S&ttlement -0.021 -0.018 -0.009 -0.027 -0.024 -0.012
(1.78) (1.51) (1.16) (1.99)f (1.57) (1.30)
Gov 't Action -0.011 -0.012 -0.005 -0.015 -0.015 -0.001
(1.09) (1.18) (0.44) (0.81) (0.83) (0.04)
High Prqtile -0.015 -0.015 -0.033 0.012 0.012 -0.014(I1.07) (I1.07) (2.28)* (0.62) (0.61) (0.54)
Auction 0.023 0.019 0.077 -0.086 -0.092 0.093
(0.40) (0.33) (6.0 1)** (0.75) (0.81) (1.48)
Docket Entries 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.009 0.008 0.010
(0.13) (0.14) (0.24) (0.49) (0.45) (0.95)
Experience 0.015 0.025 -0.050 0.144 0.152 0.032
(0.59) (0.96) (.I 1) (0.31) (0.33) (0.08)
Age 0.031 0.030 0.029 0.021 0.021 0.018
(2.31)* (2.22)* (4.36)** (1.31) (1.30) (2.30)*
1 (ircuit 0.062 0.061 0.033 0.025 0.026 -0.029
(I.77) (I.73) (I.03) (1.44) (1.54) (1.15)
3d Circuit 0.035 0.033 0.020 0.075 0.072 0.040
(0.81) (0.76) (0.55) (3.03)* (2.7 1)* (2.55)*
4 Circuit 0.063 0.061 0.039 0.012 0.010 -0.050
(1.66) (1.56) (1.08) (0.38) (0.32) (1.04)
5 Circuit 0.054 0.052 0.023 0.060 0.059 0.012
(1.59) (1.53) (0.73) (4.22)** (4.14)** (0.58)
6" Circuit 0.049 0.048 0.020 0.041 0.040 -0.013
(1.16) (1.10) (0.51) (2.84)* (2.83)* (0.37)
7 ' Circuit 0.055 0.054 0.019 0.103 0.103 0.044
(1.43) (1.38) (0.57) (4.63)** (4.64)** (1.31)
8" Circuit 0.093 0.091 0.070 0.037 0.035 -0.031
(2.43)* (2.33)* (2.04) (1.25) (1.23) (0.48)
9
' Circuit 0.018 0.017 -0.008 0.013 0.012 -0.030
(0.58) (0.54) (0.31) (0.82) (0.77) (4.80)**
10t" (ircuit 0.086 0.086 0.061 0.077 0.076 0.031
(2.67)* (2.64)* (1 .96)t; (4.17)** (4.43)** (1.51)
11"' (ircuit 0.043 0.043 0.017 0.093 0.093 0.046
(1.24) (1 .23) (0.54) (5.19)** (5.20)** (1.95)-
D(' (ircut 0.027 0.025 -0.013 0.112 0.110 0.040
(0.51) (0.46) (0.25) (3.50)** (3.40)** (1.00)
Year 1992 -0.020 -0.019 -0.020 -0.174 -0.171 -0.163
(0.70) (0.69) (0.65) (6.17)** (5.55)** (6.42)**
Year 1993 -0.096 -0.097 -0.035 -0.147 -0.148 -0.051
(1.00) (1.00) (0.58) (0.91) (0.92) (0.49)
Year 1994 -0.050 -0.049 -0.047 -0.136 -0.133 -0.120
(I .06) (I .02) (I .02) (I .36) (1.33) (1.33)
Year 1995 0.029 0.030 0.026 -0.025 -0.023 -0.010
(2.32)* (2.32)* (3.I4)** (1.40) (1.24) (0.50)
Year 1996 -0.075 -0.075 -0.080 -0.095 -0.094 -0.100
(I.84)- (I1.86)t; (2.20)* (3.67)** (3.7 1)** (7.28)**
Year 1997 -0.131 -0.130 -0.139 -0.247 -0.246 -0.260
(3.18)** (3.20)** (3.46)** (7.74)** (7.85)** (13.84)**
Year 1998 -0.044 -0.045 -0.055 -0.203 -0.204 -0.228
(1.69) (1.63) (1.64) (13.45)** (13.66)** (6.40)**
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Full Sample Ratios < 1
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Year 1999 -0.074 -0.075 -0.079 -0.169 -0.170 -0.177
(2.54)* (2.59)* (2.83)* (10.57)** (10.64)** (6.61)**
Year 2000 -0.062 -0.061 -0.057 -0.133 -0.131 -0.119
(5.20)** (5.17)** (5.69)** (5.91)** (5.99)** (4.69)**
Year 2001 -0.057 -0.056 -0.051 -0.143 -0.142 -0.134
(3.08)* (3.18)** (2.33)* (6.99)** (7.21)** (5.54)**
Year 2002 -0.041 -0.041 -0.034 -0.158 -0.159 -0.145
(1.73) (l .66) (1.59) (4.01)** (4.05)** (4.38)**
Year 2003 -0.054 -0.054 -0.043 -0.136 -0.135 -0.106(2.06)t (2.05)t (1 .95)t (7.28)** (7.19)** (5.43)**
Year 2004 -0.044 -0.042 -0.038 -0.102 -0.102 -0.093
(2.05)t (1.91)+- (1.89)t (4.44)** (4.38)** (3.39)**
Year 2005 -0.046 -0.045 -0.043 -0.121 -0.120 -0.123
(3.96)** (3.63)** (5.31)* (3.61)** (3.63)** (3.20)**
Year 2006 -0.079 -0.077 -0.076 -0.149 -0.147 -0.173
(1.89)t (1.80)t (2.07)t (3.79)** (3.70)** (4.41)**
Year 2007 -0.033 -0.033 -0.016 -0.097 -0.096 -0.043
(1.24) (1.14) (069) (3 60)** (3.21)** (1 75)
Constant 1.229 1.187 1.062 1.273 1235 1.076
(11.58)** (10.57)** (18.38)** (7.06)** (5.90)** (7.04)**
Observations 674 674 662 335 335 326
R-squared 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.16 0.20
Robust t statistics in parentheses.
t significant at 10% * significant at 5%; ** significant at 10%
Note: All models cluster standard errors by circuit with t statistics reported in parentheses. As a robustness
check, Models 3 and 6 omit logged settlements in excess of 20. Settlement, Docket Entries, and Age are log-
transformed. Settlement is in constant 2005 dollars.
Sources: Institutional Shareholder Services, Securities (lass Action Database; Stanford Law School,
Securities (lass Action (learinghouse; CRSP; COMPUSTAT; CM/ECF; PACER; Securities (lass Action
Alert, Class Action Reports.
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Figure 1: Mean and Median Fee Awards (Second Circuit Only)
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Figure 2A: Logged Fee Award to Logged Settlement (Full Sample)
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Figure 2B: Logged Fee Award to Logged Settlement (Logged Settlements < 20)
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Figure 3A: Logged Fee Request to Logged Settlement (Full Sample)
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Figure 3B: Logged Fee Request to Logged Settlement (Logged Settlements < 20)
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Figure 4: Mean and Median Ratio Award to Request
Goldberger and Non Goldberger Cases
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Figure 5: Mean and Median Ratio Award to Request (2d Circuit Only)
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